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DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
Volume VI SPRING-SUMMER 1957 Number 2
UNLAWFUL SEARCH AND SEIZURE IN ILLINOIS
W. ELBERT WASHINGTON
F UPON his wife's complaint, a man is arrested and the police search
his home with his wife's permission, does he have the right to have
evidence thus seized excluded upon trial of the case? The man-
ner in which the Supreme Court of Illinois resolved the foregoing
question1 and its treatment of other vexing problems arising from the
use of evidence obtained as a result of searches and seizures concerns
not only attorneys practicing criminal law, but all persons interested
in law enforcement and constitutional guarantees. Guideposts and
tests used in determining whether certain evidence should be excluded
as being illegally obtained, the basis for motions to suppress evidence
obtained as a result of illegal search and seizure, as well as Illinois cases
dealing with the problem, constitute the material of this article. By
way of a caveat, it should be borne in mind that the constitutional
guaranty against unlawful search and seizure applies to governmental
bodies and their agencies, and has no application when an individual
has been subjected to an unlawful search and seizure by a private
party not connected with the particular organ of government inter-
ested in the matter.
BASIS FOR SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE
The basis for the exclusion of evidence unlawfully obtained may
be found in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the United States
Constitution and in the provisions of the constitutions and laws of the
various states and territories. Some twenty-one states, two territories
MR. WASHINGTON is a graduate of De Paul University College of Law, is a member of
the Illinois and Michigan Bars, and a partner in the Chicago law firm of Washington
and Durham.
I People v. Shambley, 4 Ill. 2d 38, 122 N.E. 2d 172 (1954).
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and the District of Columbia have provisions patterned, by and large,
upon those of the Federal Constitution.' The pertinent provisions in
Illinois are Sections 6 and 10 of Article II of the Illinois Constitution.
Section 6 provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, papers, and effects
shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue without probable cause, sup-
ported by affidavit, particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons and things to be seized.
The provisions of Section 10 of Article II are as follows:
No person shall be compelled in any criminal case to give evi-
dence against himself, or be twice put in jeopardy for the same
offense.
In Illinois there is, by statute, a further limitation on searches and
seizures, in that only certain types of items may be the subject for the
issuance of search warrants. 8 The objects that may be subject to
search by warrant are usually classified as being contraband objects.
In reading the provisions of the Illinois Constitution4 and the Illinois
statutes governing the issuance of search warrants,' it may be seen by
implication that the constitutional privilege against unlawful search
and seizure was most certainly intended to include contraband arti-
cles, because those are the only properties for which a search warrant
may lawfully issue. It is a requirement of the Illinois Constitution and
the Illinois statutes that before a search warrant shall lawfully issue,
the objects sought to be seized must be particularly described as must
the place that is sought to be searched. 6
In the case of People v. Castree7 the accused occupied a building,
one room of which was used as a store, and the rest of which was used
by the accused as a dwelling. A search warrant issued permitting the
search of that portion of the building used as a store. After the issu-
ance of the search warrant, the officers searched the dwelling of the
accused and discovered certain intoxicating liquors which were kept
in violation of the law. At the trial of the case, a motion to suppress
2 United States, Alaska, California, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii,
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, North
Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, West Vir-
ginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming, as set forth in 50 A.L.R. 2d 556.
3 ll. Rev. Stat. (1874) c. 38, 5 692, as amended, Ill. Rev. Stat. (1933) c. 38, § 691.
4 I11. Const. Art. II, §§ 6, 10.
5 Authority cited note 3 supra.
6Authorities cited notes 3 and 4 supra.
7 311 111. 392, 143 N.E. 112 (1924).
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the liquors was properly made and the court overruled it. In an opin-
ion of the Illinois Supreme Court the following statement was made,
after quoting Article II, Section 6, of the Illinois Constitution:
Not all searches are prohibited, but unreasonable searches, only. Warrants
may issue but not without probable cause, supported by affidavit, and only to
search the place particularly described. A search without a warrant is an un-
reasonable search, and a search of a place not described is without a warrant
and is unreasonable. The search of the plaintiff in error's dwelling under a
warrant particularly describing a store was unreasonable,s and therefore was
an invasion of the right of security guaranteed him by section 6 of the Bill of
Rights. 9
The application of Section 10, Article II, apparently is necessarily
correlated to the application of Section 6 of the same article. In order
for Section 6 to have any meaning whatsoever, as a practical matter,
it is necessary that Section 10 be applied. Section 6 sets out the prohi-
bition, against unlawful search and seizure, but that section does not
specifically state what is to be done when a person or place is sub-
jected to an unlawful search and seizure and the evidence obtained is
sought to be used against that person. It is at the time when such evi-
dence is sought to be used against the accused that the operation of
Section 10 comes into effect. By invoking his rights under Section 10,
the accused may ask and demand that evidence obtained by a viola-
tion of another constitutional right of his, the right against unlawful
searches and seizures, is not thereby used against him to his detriment.
In the case of People v. Grod,10 the Illinois Supreme Court said: "The
seizure or compulsory production of a man's private papers, property
or effects to be used in evidence against him is equivalent to com-
pelling him to give evidence against himself, and in a criminal case is
prohibited by the Constitution."
THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
The jurisdictions excluding evidence obtained as a result of unlaw-
ful searches and seizures have become widely known as exclusionary
jurisdictions, or jurisdictions applying the "exclusionary rule." The
so-called "exclusionary rule" was developed in the case of United
States v. Weeks," a 1914 case. Jurisdictions applying the rule of ex-
8 Italics added.
9 People v. Castree, 311 IMI. 392, 395, 143 N.E. 112, 113 (1924).
10385 Ill. 584, 590, 53 N.E. 2d 591, 594 (1944).
11232 U.S. 383 (1914).
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clusion do not permit the use of evidence which is obtained by unlaw-
ful search and seizure, if "timely" application to exclude is made by
the accused, but there is no uniformity as to what amounts to "timely"
application.
Illinois is supposedly committed to the view that a pre-trial motion
must be made to exclude evidence, or otherwise the court will not
take cognizance of how the evidence was obtained.12 The reason
given for the Illinois view is that courts should not interrupt the
orderly course of a trial and try collateral issues such as the source of
evidence sought to be introduced. The decision to which the cases
applying the rule that a pre-trial motion must be made in order to ex-
clude the fruit of unreasonable searches and seizures usually refer is
People v. Gindrat.13 At this point, therefore, a brief discussion of that
case is in order. The defendants in the Gindrat case were tried for
larceny of a diamond ring. The facts indicate that an off-duty police-
man, dressed in civilian clothes, went to defendants' home, and
searched the place without a search warrant or other authority. He
discovered certain imitation diamond rings, which were subsequently
introduced into evidence over the objections of defendants. In its
opinion the Illinois Supreme Court indicated that the police officer
who had obtained the imitation rings had done so as a private citizen,
that no governmental agency had been involved in the procurement
of the evidence, and that although the police officer could be sued in
a civil court for trespass, the criminal court had no right to go into
the collateral question as to how the evidence was obtained.
The court indicated that there was no unlawful search as to the
criminal case, but that the evidence had come from an independent,
private source which would be the concern of a civil court. The court
then indicated that since there was no question as to whether the con-
stituional rights and privileges of defendants had been invaded, the
only proper objection to the evidence at that stage of the trial would
be as to the competency and relevancy of such evidence.
People v. Brocamp14 is supposedly the first Illinois Supreme Court
12 The City of Chicago v. Lord, 7 Ill. 2d 379, 130 N.E. 2d 504 (1955); People v. Va-
lecek, 404 Ill. 461, 89 N.E. 2d 368 (1949); People v. Dalpe, 371 Ill. 607, 21 N.E. 2d 756
(1939); People v. Anderson, 337 Ill. 310, 169 N.E. 243 (1929); People v. Drury, 335 111.
539, 167 N.E. 823 (1929); People v. Castree, 311 111. 392, 143 N.E. 112 (1924); People v.
Brocamp, 307 Ill. 448, 138 N.E. 728 (1923).
18 138 111. 103, 27 N.E. 1085 (1891).
14 307 Ill. 448, 138 N.E. 728 (1923).
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decision to rule on the question of whether property was obtained by
unlawful search and seizure. One of the court's statements, started
the present line of Illinois authority that a pre-trial motion is necessary
in order to take advantage of the constitutional provision against evi-
dence unlawfully obtained. In the Brocamp case,' 6 proper motions
were made to exclude certain evidence as being obtained unlawfully,
prior to the commencement of the trial. The trial court denied the
motions, the evidence was admitted and defendant was found guilty.
In reversing the decisions of the trial court, the Illinois Supreme Court
held that the evidence should have been excluded because obtained by
an unlawful search and seizure. In elaborating further, the court made
the following statement:
An offer of proof made on the trial of a cause raises no other question than
that of the competency, relevancy and materiality of the evidence offered.
17
Consequently the court, on an objection being made, cannot be expected to
stop the trial of the case and enter upon the trial of a collateral issue as to the
source from which the evidence was obtained. This court has repeatedly refused
to enter upon the trial of such collateral issues even when the objection raised
to the competency of the evidence was based upon the claim that the evidence
had been secured by means of unlawful search and seizure, in violation of the
defendant's constitutional rights.' 8
In corroboration of that view the court cited the Gindrat case.' 9 The
court also said in the Brocamp case:
In 10 R.C.L. 933, after laying down the rule of law that in the orderly course
of the trial the court will not stop the trial to determine in what manner the evi-
dence has been obtained, and that an objection that exhibits have been obtained
by unlawful search and seizure will only be considered as raising an objection
to the competency and relevancy of the evidence, it is said: "It is obvious, and
the courts have frequently declared, that if letters and private documents may
be seized in violation of the constitutional safeguard and held and used in evi-
dence against a citizen accused of crime then the constitutional provision is in-
effectual and of no value." It is further stated by the author, in substance, that
the defendant should make timely application to the court, before the beginning
of the trial, for an order directing the return to the applicant of the property
or of the papers unlawfully seized, and that on such an application the question
of the legality of the seizure must be fully heard, and if the court erroneously
refuses to order such return and thereafter receives the property in evidence
against the applicant over his objection; it is an error for which a judgment of
conviction must be reversed.
15 Ibid., at 456 and 732.
16 Authority cited note 14 supra.
17 No such question was before the court.
18 People v. Brocamp, 307 Ill. 448, 454, 138 N.E. 728, 731 (1923).
19 People v. Gindrat, 138 IMI. 103, 27 N.E. 1085 (1891).
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In People v. Castree,2° the Illinois Supreme Court did not discuss
the point independently, but referred to its decision in the Brocamp2'
case and stated that that case was the law. Most of the recent cases22
have stated that the law was settled a long time ago by People v.
Brocamp. In People v. Anderson,23 the Illinois Supreme Court did not
entirely rule out the possibility of the court's sustaining a motion to
suppress made for the first time after the commencement of trial. In
the Anderson case the court said:
Plaintiff in error did not make a motion for a suppression of this evidence
before the commencement of the trial but waited until after the jury had been
impaneled and the trial commenced. Where it is claimed that evidence against
one accused of crime has been obtained by an unlawful search of his house and
seizure of his effects, the question of such unlawful search and seizure must be
presented to the court before the trial, if possible.2 4
It is submitted that older opinions like the Gindrat case 2' were not
liberal in their application of the pertinent constitutional provisions
against unlawful search and seizure. Few jurisdictions, if any, apply-
ing the exclusionary rule would hold an off-duty police officer
(whether in uniform or not) to be a stranger and private citizen not
connected with governmental authorities in any way, if such officer
obtained evidence against a citizen by unlawful search and seizure.
The real difference between the earlier cases and the Brocamp case
is that the latter tended to give some meaning to the constitutional
provisions against unlawful search and seizure instead of the very
limited construction and application in the earlier cases. The better
view, which appears possible under the Illinois cases, appears to be
for the courts to hold that when the accused has knowledge prior to
trial of the intended use against him of evidence unlawfully obtained
from him or his premises, he must make a motion to exclude such
evidence prior to the commencement of the trial; but if, on the other
hand, an accused first learns of such evidence during the course of
the trial, he should not be denied his constitutional rights because of
20311 111. 392, 143 N.E. 112 (1924).
21307 Ill. 448, 138 N.E. 728 (1923).
22 The City of Chicago v. Lord, 7 IIl. 2d 379, 130 N.E. 2d 504 (1955); People v. Drury,
335 111. 539, 167 N.E. 823 (1929).
23 337 Ill. 310, 169 N.E. 243 (1929).
24 Ibid., at 328 and 249. The court indicates that the rule should not be ironclad by
adding, "if possible."
25 People v. Gindrat, 138 Ill. 103, 27 N.E. 1085 (1891).
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a fact over which he had no control. In the latter instance an accused
should have a right to a hearing to determine whether the evidence
was unlawfully obtained, even though it would cause an interruption
of the trial of the cause. Constitutional rights and privileges are treas-
ured ones, and if they are to be deemed waived by an individual
it should be only upon his neglect or refusal to invoke them when he
knows they are in issue.
WHAT SEARCHES AND SEIZURES ARE UNLAWFUL
The cases show that what amounts to an unlawful search is not a
static thing always exhibiting the same shape. As to the search of a
building or premises without a search warrant, the law seems to be
very clear (except in a few instances) that such a search is definitely
unlawful. In People v. Brocamp the court said:
It is very clear that the defendant's constitutional rights were ruthlessly and
unlawfully violated. The officers had no right whatever to enter his home by
force or by permission of another in his absence and search his premises without
first obtaining a proper warrant for such search and seizure, as required by our
constitution.26
There were some later cases in which the principles announced in the
preceding case, as to the search of a dwelling or other premises with-
out a search warrant, were discussed with approval.27 Later in the case
of People vs. Grod,2s the court stated that the search of a dwelling
or other premises without a search warrant is unreasonable as a matter
of law. In the Grod case, an opinion written by Mr. Justice Gunn,
the Illinois Supreme Court said, that "[t]here is a distinction between
the search of a dwelling house without a warrant, and the search of
the person of the defendant, or of the vehicle in which he is riding,
in that the first is unreasonable as a matter of law, whereas the latter
may depend upon the particular circumstances of the case."29 Before
making the aforementioned decision, the court reviewed the previ-
ously decided cases on the point and said that the "exact question
before us was not decided in any of these cases, but the conclusion to
be drawn from them is that the search of one's dwelling without a
26307 111. 448, 453, 138 N.E. 728, 730 (1923).
27People v. Dalpe, 371 l. 607, 21 N.E. 2d 756 (1939); People v. Lind, 370 I. 131,
18 N.E. 2d 189 (1938); People v. Poncher, 358 111. 73, 192 N.E. 732 (1934); and People
v. Castree, 311 111. 392, 143 N.E. 728 (1924).
28 385 IIl. 584, 53 N.E. 2d 591 (1944).
29 Ibid., at 592 and 595.
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warrant is unreasonable, and any articles taken may, upon motion, be
either impounded by the court, or ordered returned to defendant,
and not be permitted to be used as evidence in the case."
Where the search warrant fails to describe the premises to be
searched, it seems to be very clear that the search and seizure based
thereon are unlawful.30 There is no question about the unlawfulness
of the search when the search warrant does not describe the property
to be seized, or the affidavit on which a warrant is obtained is insuffi-
cient or lacking, because the statutory provisions under which search
warrants may issue clearly set forth the requirements.31
The trouble area as to what searches are unlawful starts when
there has been a lawful arrest of the accused prior to the search. It is
a well-settled principle of law that when an individual is lawfully
arrested, the officer or other person making the arrest has a lawful
right to search that person as an incident to the arrest. 2 There is little
argument as to whether the portable personal property which one
has with him at the time of a lawful arrest is subject to search as an
incident to the lawful arrest, although the language used in People v.
Poncher3 3 seems to limit the search of the personal property which
accused may have with him to property "involved" in the crime
charged. In commenting on People v. Poncher,3 4 and People v.
Davies, 5 the Illinois Supreme Court, in the opinion of People v. Grod,
quoted from the Poncher case with approval as follows: "What the
opinion means to hold, and does hold, is, that if a person is arrested
he may be searched for weapons and for property in his immediate
personal possession which are involved in the crime charged.'3 6
As to the right of an officer to make a search of premises as an
incident to a lawful arrest of a person, the Illinois cases are contradic-
tory. The better reasoned cases seem to indicate that there is a very
limited right, if any, to search premises as an incident to a lawful ar-
rest. People v. Davies,87 apparently the first case relied on for the
S0 People v. Castree, 311 Ill. 392, 143 N.E. 112 (1924).
3111. Rev. Stat. (1874) c. 38, § 692, as amended, 111. Rev. Stat. (1933) c. 38, § 691.
82 People v. Grod, 385 Ill. 584, 53 N.E. 2d 591 (1944); People v. Lind, 370 Ill. 131,
18 N.E. 2d 189 (1938); People v. Poncher, 358 Ill. 73, 192 N.E. 732 (1934); People v.
North, 139 IM. 81, 28 NE. 966 (1891).
83 358 111. 73, 192 N.E. 732 (1934). 84 Ibid.
8S 354 Il. 168, 188 N.E. 337 (1933).
86 385 Ill. 584, 590, 53 N.E. 2d 591, 594 (1944) (Italics added).
87 Authority cited note 35 supra.
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above proposition, certainly does not stand for such proposition. The
facts in that case do not indicate that there was a search at all. The
police officers went to the home of defendant, and defendant drew a
gun on them and ordered them off his premises. Defendant also used
very foul language and threatened to kill the officers, although one
of the officers pulled off his star and held it against the window so
defendant could see it. Despite the actions of the officers defendant
refused to admit them although he was told that he was under arrest.
The police officers left the premises and returned with some other
officers, at which time they were admitted to defendant's home. Up-
on admission to defendant's home, the officers found defendant sitting
in the kitchen, but he did not have the gun. The officers asked de-
fendant to give them the gun, and, at first, he refused to do so, but
subsequently instructed his wife to get the gun and give it to the
officers. There is nothing about the facts in that case that remotely
indicates a search of one's premises may be made as an incident to a
lawful arrest. From the facts previously stated there was no search
at all, but there was a demand for a gun which was produced in re-
sponse to the demand. There could have been a question of coercion,
but certainly there was no search.
Another case which has been cited as standing for the proposition
that premises of a defendant may be searched as an incident to a law-
ful arrest is People v. Dubin.3 8 In that case the officers had a warrant
for the arrest of defendant for violating certain laws relating to the
practice of dentistry. When the officers arrived at defendant's offices
they saw the premises being used for similar violations to the ones
charged in the warrant. The entire premises were being used for such
violations, and when the officers arrested defendant they searched the
premises and seized devices that were being used in violation of the
act charged in the warrant. The court held that the officers saw the
premises being used for the violation of the law and they certainly
had a right to search the premises which they saw being so used. The
circumstances in that case are not distantly related to a search of
premises being incident to a lawful arrest of a person. The law is
definitely settled, by statute, that if an officer or other person sees a
crime being committed that such officer or person may arrest the
offender without a warrant.8 9
88367 11. 229, 10 N.E. 2d 809 (1934).
89 11. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 38, S 657.
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There is no reason why officers should be denied the right to search
premises for instruments of crime when the officers see the premises
being used for crime. It is the opinion of the author that the result in
that case is and should be limited to instances where the arresting
officers actually see the premises searched being used for crime. In
such instances, the premises cannot be arrested, so it appears to be
logical that a search should be permitted when the crime or crimes
are being so committed.
In People v. Marvin,40 the search did not involve premises or a
house or building but involved an automobile, although that case has
been many times cited as standing for the proposition that premises
may be searched as an incident to a lawful arrest. The preceding state-
ment is also true as to the case of People v. Tabet.4 In the case of
People v. Tillman,42 (assuming that the arrest was lawful, which is
doubtful) the defendant was lying on the mattress at the time of the
arrest; and the narcotics, which were found under the mattress, were
in such close proximity to the person of defendant that it could be
said to be a part of his person. The facts in that case do not tend to
give an open license to officers to search premises as an incident to a
lawful arrest.
The case that comes closest to permitting a search of premises as
an incident to a lawful arrest is People v. McGowan.3 In that case
the officers saw three parties emerge from a basement carrying bags
and arrested them because one of the three was carrying a bag which
was open and which showed policy slips. The other two bags also
contained policy slips. The officers went into the building from
which they had seen the men emerge and saw a man looking through
a small window. The officers asked admittance and were refused.
They proceeded to break in and arrest all parties in the room and
searched the place. In its opinion on the case, the Illinois Supreme
Court indicated that the officers saw the premises being used in the
commission of a crime, but the court later gave as its reason for the
decision the fact that the officers had a right to search the premises
incident to the lawful arrest of the first three individuals. In support
of that contention a number of cases were cited, all of which stand
40 358 111. 426, 193 N.E. 202 (1934).
41 402 Il. 93, 83 N.E. 2d 329 (1949).
42 1 111. 2d 525, 116 N.E. 2d 344 (1953).
48 415 M.1 375, 114 N.E. 2d 407 (1953).
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for the proposition that the "person" of an accused may be searched
as an incident to a lawful arrest.
Of all the cases referring to the search of premises as an incident
to a lawful arrest, People v. Grod44 (which came subsequent to a
number of those cases) is either cited with approval or is not cited
at all, although the language in that case appears to be directly op-
posed to the idea of search of premises as an incident to the lawful
arrest of a person. In citing from other cases with approval, the Illinois
Supreme Court said in People v. Grod that the law ". . cannot...
mean that, if a person is lawfully arrested on a criminal charge which
involves his possession of particular property, the officers are at lib-
erty to search his home, his place of business, or buildings of which
he may have the right of occupancy, without first obtaining a search
warrant therefor."' '45 Later in the same opinion the court stated that
search of a dwelling house of an accused is unreasonable as a matter
of law.
As to the question of the search of an automobile as an incident to
a lawful arrest when the defendant is riding therein, the cases seem
to hold that such searches are incident to the arrest and may be made
without a search warrant, and in support thereof cases are cited hold-
ing that the person of an individual lawfully arrested may be searched
as an incident to the arrest.46 In People v. Tabet,47 the question was
brought before the Illinois Supreme Court concerning the necessity
of obtaining a search warrant to search an automobile. The defendant
raised the question of statutes setting forth the requirements for ob-
taining search warrants, specifically naming automobiles as things for
which search warrants may issue.48 In that case the court stated that
since the constitutional prohibition, Article II, Section 6 of the Illinois
constitution, does not list automobiles, they were not intended to be
included in the prohibition. The court stated that the original statutes
controlling the issuance of search warrants were passed in 1874 when
no automobiles were in existence, so therefore, the use of the word
"place" in those statutes could not include an automobile. The court
44 385 111. 584, 53 N.E. 2d 591 (1944).
45 Ibid., at 590 and 594.
46People v. Edge, 406 Ill. 490, 94 N.E. 2d 359 (1953); People v. Tabet, 402 Ill. 93,
83 N.E. 2d 329 (1949).
47402 Ill. 93, 83 N.E. 2d 329 (1949).
48 111. Rev. Stat. (1933) c. 38, SS 691, 693,
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spoke of the amendment of those statutes in 1933, but did not show
what effect the amendment is to have on the search of automobiles.
POSSESSION OR OWNERSHIP OF PROPERTY SEIZED
In all of the jurisdictions applying the "exclusionary rule," the
question arises as to what interest one has to have in property seized
in order to avail himself of the constitutional privileges against un-
lawful search and seizure. Again there seems to be no uniformity
in the courts of the several jurisdictions in solving the problem.
Illinois is allegedly committed to the view that in order to assert his
constitutional privileges against search and seizure, an accused must
allege ownership.49 The cases that seem to hold that an allegation of
ownership is necessary also use the disjunctive connective "or" along
with the words "request the return" of the property. It seems as
though wide lattitude in showing the "interest" of a person in prop-
erty seized is permissible under the decisions.
People v. Poncher ° indicates that possession on the part of an
accused is sufficient to entitle an accused to the constitutional priv-
ileges against unlawful search and seizure. In People v. Grod,5' the
court discussed those cases in which language had been used to the
effect that in his motion to exclude evidence a defendant must allege
ownership thereof, and stated that in all of those cases the search was
of an automobile, in which the respective defendants were riding at
the time of their arrest. The court stated that it ". . . is to be observed
that in all of these cases the search complained of was that of an
automobile, in which the respective defendants were riding at the
time of their arrest. None of them involved the search, without a
warrant, of a dwelling house of the defendant while he was in cus-
tody.15 2 Certain dictum in People v. Perry"- indicates that in order
for an accused to avail himself of the protection afforded by the
constitutional guarantees against unlawful search and seizure, he must
show an interest in either the seized property or the premises from
which it was taken, and that he request a return of the same.
49 People v. Perry, 1 Ill. 2d 482, 116 N.E. 2d 360 (1953); People v. Tabet, 402 I1. 93,
83 N.E. 2d 329 (1949); People v. Exum, 382 IlM. 204, 47 N.E. 2d 56 (1943).
50 358 1l. 73, 192 N.E. 732 (1934).
51385 Ill. 584, 53 N.E. 2d 591 (1944).
52 Ibid., at 586 and 593.
58 1 IMI. 2d 482, 116 N.E. 2d 360 (1953).
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PERSONAL ASPECTS OF CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTIES
A reading of the provisions of the Illinois Constitution granting
immunity from unlawful search and seizure indicates that the rights
and privileges granted thereunder are personal to the individual af-
fected. There have been several cases in which the Illinois Supreme
Court, in deciding cases involving those provisions of the constitution,
held that the rights given thereby are personal to the individuals in-
volved.5" In People v. Lind, the court noted that "... . the constitu-
tional barrier to unreasonable searches and seizures is in the nature
of a personal privilege of such high character that it cannot be waived
by anyone except the person whose rights are invaded, or by someone
specifically authorized to act for him in the matter."'55 In People v.
Dent,56 the Illinois Supreme Court said:
[T]he gist of the act of invitation by another to enter premises without a
search warrant is that the invitation must be exended under specific authori-
zation. If anyone may indiscriminately waive the rights of another, the waiver
is not a personal one; hence the constitutional privilege would be of no value.
In the former case, a defendant had been arrested and placed in jail.
The officers went to his home while he was in jail, and they told his
wife who they were and that they wished to search the premises. She
permitted the search and certain evidence which was sought to be
used against the husband was found. The trial court permitted the use
of the evidence against defendant although a proper motion to sup-
press was made, and the defendant was found guilty. On the appeal,
the Illinois Supreme Court decided that the presence of the officers
amounted to coercion although some strong statements were made
concerning the constitutional guarantees against unlawful search and
seizure being personal. In the latter case, the officers went to the home
of defendant and knocked on the door. The defendant and a guest
were sitting in a room of the house. The guest invited the officers into
the home where they discovered some policy devices in open view on
a table. The defendant was arrested and tried after a proper motion
to suppress the evidence thus obtained was made. After being found
guilty, the defendant appealed the case, and the Illinois Supreme
Court held that the evidence should have been suppressed because the
54People v. Grod, 385 I. 584, 53 N.E. 2d 591 (1944); People v. Dent, 371 I1. 33,
19 N.E. 2d 1020 (1939); People v. Lind, 370 11. 131, 18 N.E. 2d 189 (1938).
55 370 Il. 131, 136, 18 N.E. 2d 189, 191 (1938).
56 371 I1. 33, 19 N.E. 2d 1020 (1939).
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guest of defendant did not have specific authority to invite the
officers into the home.
PEOPLE V. SHAMBLEY
In the case of People v. Shambley,57 the defendant was accused by
his wife of assaulting her with a gun. Defendant and his wife were
purchasing the home in which they lived. At the time of the alleged
altercation there was no one home except defendant and his wife.
She called the police and met them outside of the building. She in-
vited the officers into the premises and pointed out defendant who
was sitting in the living room. The officers arrested defendant and
searched his person, but did not find a weapon. They took defendant
to a squad car and left him with some officers. Other officers returned
to the premises and searched with the permission of defendant's wife
until they found a gun which defendant kept in the home. Prior to
the trial of the cause, defendant made a motion to suppress the gun
as evidence and to return it to defendant. The court denied the mo-
tion and the case was tried by a jury. The gun was admitted into
evidence over defendant's objections. The gun was displayed to the
jury in such a manner as to prejudice defendant's case. The jury re-
turned a verdict finding defendant guilty and defendant appealed
from the judgment on the verdict. The case raised the question,
among others, as to the legality of the search and seizure of the gun
and its use as evidence against defendant. But perhaps the most signif-
icant question was whether the right to waive one's privileges against
an unlawful search and seizure is personal to the defendant, or
whether, in the case of husband and wife, either spouse may waive the
privilege of the other. It was the position of defendant that such a
right to waive did not exist without specific authority from the other
spouse, and if such a peculiar right existed as between husband and
wife it would not be applicable in the case before the court because
the person waiving such right was admittedly antagonistic toward
defendant. In its opinion, the Illinois Supreme Court upheld the valid-
ity of the search and said as follows:
In this case the consent of the wife was freely and fully given; in fact, her
action appears to have been tantamount to an invitation. It is clear that in
giving her consent she was not acting as agent for her husband but was acting
in her own right as occupant of the premises. Such being the case, it is our con-
574 II1. 2d 38, 122 N.E. 2d 172 (1954).
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clusion that the search was both reasonable and lawful and that the court did
not err in refusing to suppress the gun as evidence. 58
In its discussion the court seemed to have ignored all decided law on
the question. The court noted that "It]he rule seems to be well estab-
lished that where two persons have equal rights to the use and occu-
pation of premises, either may give consent to a search and the evi-
dence thus disclosed can be used against either.""9
The decision and the language used by the court in that decision
seem to destroy the greater portion of an accused's rights against
unlawful searches and seizures. If the rights are personal, no one but
the person whose rights have been invaded should be permitted to
waive those rights. It would appear that constitutional rights are not
rights at all if they hang by so thin a thread that someone else, whose
rights have not been invaded, and whose interests are diametrically
opposed to the accused's rights, may waive those rights merely by
living with or occupying the same premises as the accused. The pro-
tection offered is intended for those whose rights have been violated
or invaded, and not for those who are not subject to the processes of
the law in a case in which the evidence obtained may be used against
those persons waiving the right.
CONCLUSION
The author realizes that all of the facets of the problem of unlawful
search and seizure have not been covered, and that some of the prob-
lems covered and situations pointed out may be covered in a great
deal more detail than has been attempted here, but this article is an
effort to scan the field by pointing out certain recurring problems,
and by discussing some decided cases bearing on those problems.
It is the writer's view that the rules, principles and conclusions to be
drawn from the Illinois cases, on the question of unlawful search and
seizure, are as follows: (1) that the constitutional guarantee against
unlawful search and seizure is to be liberally construed in favor of
the accused; (2) that when evidence which is the fruit of an unreas-
onable search is admitted in evidence over proper objection of the
defendant, his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is
necessarily violated; (3) that an officer who lawfully arrests a person
has a right to search that person and his portable personal property
which he has with him at that time, as an incident to the arrest; (4)
58 Ibid., at 43 and 174. 59 Ibid., at 42 and 174.
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that an officer who saw a crime committed on the premises may search
the premises for necessary evidence which was used to perpetrate the
crime; (5) that the dwelling, home, residence, place of business and
any other place to which an accused has a right to possession, use and
occupancy, all come within the scope of the protection offered by
the constitution against unlawful and unreasonable search and seizure;
(6) that when the dwelling or other places to which a person has a
right to possession, use and occupancy, are searched without a valid
search warrant, the search is unlawful as a matter of law, unless con-
sented to by such person or unless the arresting officer saw a crime
committed therein, the commission of which crime makes it necessary
to search for evidence of the same; (7) that the constitutional guaran-
tees against unlawful search and seizure and against self-incrimination
are personal to the accused and can be waived by the accused or some
person with specific authorization by the accused so to do; (8) that
a spouse has no implied authority to waive the other spouse's personal
constitutional privileges, People v. Shambley6° notwithstanding; and
(9) one who seeks to invoke his constitutional immunity against un-
lawful search and seizure does not necessarily have to allege owner-
ship of the evidence sought to be suppressed to afford him the pro-
tection offered by the constitution against unreasonable and unlawful
search and seizure.
60 Authority cited note 57 supra.
